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Changing careers is never easy. Half the world thinks you've lost your mind, headhunters say you'll never work again and your mother-in-law steps up the old "I told you so" routine. But for many burned-out, bored or multitalented folks who are sitting on skills they're not getting a chance to use, changing fields is the only way to keep from losing their marbles.

2. Don't look for "hot" fields unless they're a good fit for you. You wouldn't try to squeeze into your skinny cousin's suit, so why try a field because it works for him? People who are trying to help you will come along and do the equivalent of whispering "plastics" in your ear. Instead of jumping at their suggestions, take time to consider your options. Decide what you really want to do. When you enter a field just because it's hot, burnout isn't far behind.

3. Don't go into a field because your friend is doing well in it. Get thorough information about the fields you're considering by networking, reading and doing online research. Having informational interviews with alumni from your college, colleagues, friends or family is a fun way to get the scoop on different fields.

5. Don't let money be the deciding factor. There's not enough money in the world to make you happy if your job doesn't suit you. Workplace dissatisfaction and stress is the number-one health problem for working adults. This is particularly true for career changers, who often earn less until they get their sea legs in a different field.

6. Don't keep your dissatisfaction to yourself or try to make the switch alone. This is the time to talk to people (probably not your boss just yet, nor some coworker who likes to tell tales). Friends, family and colleagues need to know what's going on so they can help you tap into those 90-plus percent of jobs that aren't advertised until somebody has them all sewn up.

7. Don't go back to school to get retreaded unless you've done some test drives in the new field. You're never too old for an internship, a volunteer experience or trying your hand at a contract assignment in a new field. There are lots of ways to get experience that won't cost you anything except your time. A new degree may or may not make the world sit up and take notice. Be very sure where you want to go before you put yourself through the pain and debt of another degree program.

8. Be careful when using placement agencies or search firms. Do some research to be sure to find a good match. Ask those who work in the field you’re trying to get into or other successful career changers for suggestions. Try to find a firm that knows how to be creative when placing career changers -- not one that solely focuses on moving people up the ladder in the same field.

9. Don't go to a career counselor or a career transitions agency expecting they can tell you which field to enter. Career advisors are facilitators, and they'll follow your lead. They can help ferret out your long-buried dreams and talents, but you'll have to do the research and the decision making by yourself. Anyone who promises to tell you what to do is dangerous.

EXpert - Juan dela Cruz is an expert on anything, from basketball to cars, from street food to computers. Ask him about anything and he has a ready answer in the back of his head. Discuss with him the latest political debate and he will entertain you for hours on his knowledge of the political economy, the laws of supply and demand and diminishing returns, the Constitution and the price of galunggong. His favorite TV shows are Knowledge Power, Isyu 101, Debate and Partners Mel and Jay. With all this stock knowledge accumulated in his head, no wonder Juan dela Cruz wants to be a millionaire!

EXpecting - He expects everything from everybody. He expects to get good value for his money. He expects government to repair the roads and get rid of traffic and floods. He expects his bride to be both a virgin and a tiger in the sack. He expects everybody else to be honest, cooperative and law-abiding. Everybody else, except him.

EXtravagant - The extravagance of Juan dela Cruz is well-known. He will blow a fortune for the barangay fiesta. He will draw out his hard-earned money just to bring home a 42-inch, flat screen TV with P-in-P, just to impress his non-expatriate neighbors. He will buy a WAP cellphone, a portable MP3 player with turbo bass, or a palmtop just because it looks cool and fits nicely in his Eastpack bodybag. Yet, he is always a month or two behind the apartment rental.

EXempt - He was exempted from the ROTC because he either had asthma, 200 vision, or two left feet. He is exempted from kneeling in church and from falling in line. He is exempted from doing voluntary community service because he pays his taxes anyway. Come April, he also tries to be exempted from paying his taxes.

EXclusive - Mr. Dela Cruz belongs to a group that shuns away mere mortals. He lives in an exclusive village (subdivision is for wage earners). His children study at exclusive schools (public schools are for pedestrians). He is either a fratman, a Mason, a Lion, a Jaycee, a Rotarian, a Knight of Columbus, an OXO Sigue-sigue, or a Sputnik.

EX-something – If the words Dr., Atty., or Engr. are not affixed to his name, chances are Juan dela Cruz held a position or title of some significance in the past. He can be ex-chairman, ex-mayor, or even an ex-president or ex-Sgt.-of-Arms of a club. He is either an ex-cop, ex-PC, ex-Army or ex-barangay tanod. If not, he has a relative up to the fourth degree of affinity or consanguinity who was ex-something. The title does not matter, ex-anything but ex-convict.

EXtra - Gather up your pictures of the EDSA Revolution, the 1989 coup d’etat, EDSA Dos and Tres, and sure enough, Juan dela Cruz is somewhere out there in the huddled masses. Whether it be a film shoot, a crime scene, a political rally or any event worthy of a tabloid cover or 6 o’clock news feature, he is in the middle of it. Juan as the Dakilang Extra, turned “audience participation” into an art form and gave new meaning to the word kibitzer (usisero).

EXcusable - He has an excuse for everything. Traffic was heavy; the streets were flooded; he had to work late with the boys or “It’s not lipstick, it’s ketchup!” He is in a hurry whenever he runs a counter-flow in traffic; he didn’t see the sign when caught on a one-way street; he sent the check three days before when confronted by his creditors; he thought she was nineteen when caught with a minor.

EXperienced - Juan dela Cruz had gone through it all. He recalls the time when one peso can get you through the day in luxury. He had his “baptism” somewhere in Calumpang during his college years; he in turned baptized his girlfriend in Pasig on their second date. He knew the hardships of martial law. He was there from EDSA 1 to EDSA Tres. And in between, he was either in Saudi, Japan or Hong Kong working his fingers to the bone.

I have received several e-mails in recent months from people telling of their woes while building a web site -- not knowing where to start, not knowing what to include, not knowing what to do. The e-mails to which I refer all have one thing in common: The designers were trying to build their own site.

It is rare to have problems figuring out what to do when building a client's site. You simply sit them down and ask them what they want, how much to they wish to pay, and when do they want it done. Those answers will usually dictate a direction in which to proceed. But to build one's own site is somewhat different, although the process should be quite similar.

The other thing that must be done is that decisions must be made - and then the web designer needs to stick with those decisions unless there is a technical reason to alter those plans. Too often designers, knowing what all they can do, cannot decide which of those talents to put to use. Therefore, they either use virtually every option available to make the site so flashy and complicated that it takes an act of Congress to get it open, or they withhold their trade "secrets," and the site just lays there like a dead fish.

The easiest way to start is to look at sites located in your area that are in the same business. You can easily see mistakes of others, even though you may not be able to recognize your own. By reviewing this cross-section of sites, you can get an idea of what topics they include, what they don't include, and what topics you think should be included. Make notes. How fancy were those sites? How fast were they? Was the content adequate? What makes your business different from those you reviewed? Where can you get a competitive edge?

Next is to take a look at similar businesses from around the country or world. Again, notice the content, the design, and the differences. Are any of those things pertinent to your area or your business? If so, make sure you include them. Once those questions are answered, you begin making an outline of what you wish to produce. It does come down to what you like or dislike.

Perhaps the best way to tackle your own web site is to get an opinion from someone you respect. My company has been approached several times to do such studies, both in and out of the web designing business, and it proves to be interesting for us, too. Such services should not destroy your company's piggy bank.

URL: If possible, it is important to have a domain that is as pertinent to a business as possible. It is also important to have a domain, rather than a sub domain with an address such as http://www.somewhere.com/your business/ because that shows a lack of professionalism and commitment on your part by not investing in your business.

Visual Impact: First impressions are always important, and nowhere more so than on the Internet where viewers can go somewhere else in seconds. Nothing is a substitute for content, but to get viewers to see that content it is important to have a site that is visually attractive so they will stay long enough to see it.

Load Speed: No secret here. We figure you have about 30 seconds to get something worth reading on the screen, if not have the entire page loaded. In today's design market, the use of Flash and other animations can delay the total loading of the page, but at least get something for the viewer to read on screen within the first 20-30 seconds.

Originality: Recently a potential client came to us and showed us their web site and asked what we could do to improve it. The first thing I told them was that we would emanate the template used for their front page. To demonstrate, I did a web search for the name of the template and turned up several thousand sites using it. They all basically looked alike. The person was not happy to see that after spending about $7,000 on their site. If you must use a WYSIWIG editor, at least use your own graphics to make the finished product original.

Professionalism: A web site should reflect properly on the business that owns it. In other words, if you are building a web site for a funeral home, avoid making the site look like it was built for Comedy Central. That would seem to be an obvious thing to do, but it is surprising how many sites are so inappropriately designed.

Contact Info: One of the biggest surprises I have found is the number of sites that make it difficult for potential clients to get in touch with the company. That is one of the most important things needed on a site. Some sites tell viewers how to get in touch with the webmaster, but that is not necessarily the person they need to talk to for information. Make it clear.

Style sheets: By using style sheets, you are telling your users that you are interested in not wasting their money. That is because style sheets enable changes to be made more quickly, and as the internet universe spins more and more toward the use of style sheets, the clients' sites will work for a reasonable amount of time before needing an overhaul.

Freshness: Your web site should undergo frequent change - not complete redesign - but enough change to offer something new when viewers come to visit. That is important because it can also be a selling point for the designer who wishes to sell the client on a maintenance contract or periodic updates. Monkey see, monkey do.

Browser Compatibility: It is important to know how browsers handle various items. For example, while Internet Explorer and Netscape will show the bullets used in this list as filled-in boxes, Opera will display them as empty boxes. Because potential clients find your site in all types of browsers - and their sites will be viewed likewise - it is important to make sure your site looks its best in each type of browser.

Use of technology: If you site appears modern and features the use of technology, whether it be Flash, Java, JavaScript, or whatever, it will more likely score higher in the visual impact, originality, and professionalism categories. It also helps sell the potential client on having the same type of approach to their site.

By reviewing the items that made the sites score the highest in particular areas, we often can spot patterns and make recommendations that the designer or site owner may wish to include when redesigning or correcting a site or when having it done. It also gives the evaluator ideas for other sites, including his/her own.

It is also good to tell readers why those services are important and why you should be the one doing the work. That may sound like blowing your own horn, and it is, but who better to do that than you? By explaining how your expertise and talent is an advantage to potential clients, you also demonstrate their need to have you do the work. It is important for a client to know your strengths and for you to show confidence in those strengths.

Yes and no. Samples should be available, but how they are made available depends on what they are. For example, if you are offering samples of small files, such as bullets, lines, and clipart of that nature, or even web sites that do not have major time-eating components, then go for it. However, if you wish to demonstrate large graphics, java applets, Flash TM files, and other time-consuming items, it is best to describe those elements and offer a link to those who wish to see them in detail. Thumbnails with links can also do the trick.

Now that you have gone to the trouble to build a site and get it the way you want it, use it to your advantage. When you contact potential clients - or they contact you - guide them to the site so that they can read more about what you have to offer. It's also a good way to get across such things as how much of the payment you want up front, what you are or are not willing to do, and other services they may find they want but not even realize you provide.

Make sure the site enables readers to realize that you can build sites that cover the cost spectrum, with varying degrees of features and sizes. The company that wants a small, simple site today may want a much larger one in the future - and the cost associated with customer retention is usually much less than the cost of tracking down a new client.

Of all the recommendations made here, perhaps the most important one is to make a decision and get started. Too often people spend more time mulling over what to put on their site than they do actually building it. If the thought process is going forward, that's good. If you're Spinning your wheels, that's not good. Make decisions and stick with them. Usually, a person's first impression is their best impression, but too often people do not trust their own instincts.

Once completed, get busy promoting the site and getting out to meet potential clients, guiding them to your site for more information. And, make sure you have your telephone number and e-mail address in a prominent position on the site. You worked hard to find them; don't make them work hard to find you.

In early April of 1997 a Chinese oil and gas exploration ship, the Kan Tan III, began plying the waters between Hainan Island and the Vietnamese coast in search of petroleum. This type of exploratory activity would have been routine almost anywhere else, but in the South China Sea, where unresolved territorial disputes threaten to flare quickly, the presence of a Chinese survey ship swiftly escalated into a diplomatic scuffle between Vietnam and China. Subsequent talks failed to bring either side closer to compromise, and the crisis was averted only when the vessel, having completed its survey, withdrew from the area a month later. This particular territorial fracas did not have the "stuff of war" in it, but the commotion it generated is a reminder of the fragility of the peace reigning over the South China Sea. From the standpoint of regional security, the adamance of rival claimants to vast, overlapping water space in the South China Sea continues to make this maritime zone a brewing flashpoint.

That the multilateral dispute simmers at all is largely the responsibility of China, whose assertion of absolute sovereignty over a great majority of the South China Sea, coupled with its apparent willingness and growing ability to reinforce its claims, has effectively stymied any real progress towards a settlement. The explanation for this unbending posture is complex, rooted in goals and ambitions of many domestic actors in China. Rather surprisingly, though, Beijing's behavior in the South China Sea over the last decade has shown a consistent motivation: a growing desperation by Beijing to control the potentially lucrative natural resources of the region. While strong assertions of sovereignty form the backdrop of China's claims, and nationalism impels Beijing's leaders to defend their presumed rights there, sensitivity to resource encroachments and a growing fear of economic dependence has emerged as the primary determinant of China's willingness to assert itself physically in the South China Sea.

This article examines circumstances surrounding China's occupation of nine reefs in the Spratly island group in 1988, 1992, and 1995, in support of the thesis that economic threats have been the triggers for China's appropriation of territory in the South China Sea. The case studies will show that steps taken by rival claimants--Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines--to exploit the natural resources of the seabed incited Beijing to respond with ever-deeper physical penetrations into the Spratly archipelago. Understanding what spurred China to enlarge its presence in the South China Sea will not only strip away much of the uncertainty surrounding Beijing's intentions in this maritime zone but suggest how and where future conflict may take place, in this region and perhaps elsewhere.

Attempts to establish sovereignty over the formerly uninhabited archipelagos in the South China Sea--the Paracels and Spratlys being the largest--are a modern phenomenon. Today China is the most adamant of claimants, but for thousands of years the Chinese saw these uninhabited cays and shoals as places off the map, zones beyond civilization. China expressed no desire to control or possess barren, peripheral territories until Western encroachments, beginning with the Opium War in 1839, shocked China into a new awareness of its geographic vulnerabilities. Until then, because the islands were of marginal economic value, few other Southeast Asian states made any effort to secure clear title to them either.

The littoral states perched on the South China Sea were gradually awakened to the porosity of their borders by prolonged periods of victimization by foreign powers during the colonization era. The history of exploitation from the sea crystallized the notion among Asian leaders, especially in China and Vietnam, that they must not be soft on the issue of territorial integrity. Given the relative remoteness of the offshore islands and the frequency with which the issue of ownership was overshadowed by more pressing domestic priorities, the history of occupation and control over the archipelagos during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly of the two most contested areas, the Paracels and Spratlys, is checkered. Ownership of islets changed hands repeatedly over the last century as various regional and extra-regional actors exerted influence over the maritime expanse. As one contemporary scholar has noted with irony, "Until World War II, the islands in the South China Sea were only worth their weight in guano."

From 1956 onward, Chinese forces happened to occupy the largest island in the Spratlys, which under customary law entitled the Chinese to en toto ownership of the archipelago. But China's self-presumed dominion over the South China Sea islands was challenged in the early 1970s as their intrinsic strategic and economic value became more apparent. Taking advantage of a China distracted by the Cultural Revolution, rival claimants started methodically to absorb fragments of the Spratlys within their own boundaries. Desperate to find viable domestic sources of petroleum, both Vietnam and the Philippines began to occupy, and bolster defenses on, the largest islands in the Spratlys; by 1973 each had occupied six. Interest in developing offshore petroleum quickly added an economic dimension to the territorial disputes. Indeed, strong correlations soon developed between the relative value of oil to each claimant and the intensity of their ownership claims. This dynamic deserves greater amplification; particularly in light of the importance offshore oil has played in other maritime jurisdictional disputes around the globe.

Offshore petroleum exploration is relatively recent in Asia. Until exploiting hydrocarbons trapped below the sea floor became technologically and economically feasible, it received little official attention. However, early seismic studies in Asian waters were performed in 1968 under UN auspices, and the following decade saw most of the Southeast Asian nations establishing joint ventures for oil prospecting. Oil was discovered in 1976 at Reed Bank, midway between Palawan and the Spratlys, and production was developed by the Philippines beginning in 1979. Indonesia's offshore oil industry, which began in 1970, accounted for 35 percent of Jakarta's total oil output in 1979. Malaysia's offshore oil production doubled each year throughout the 1970s. Hanoi, eager to welcome back concessionaires in the wake of reunification, also oversaw the resumption of offshore drilling in 1976, with a six-well program. In 1981, after Western oil companies pulled out due to rigid contract terms and disappointing preliminary finds, Vietnam and the Soviet Union formed a joint venture to explore and exploit hydrocarbons from Vietnam's southern continental shelf, striking oil three years later.

China's first experiments with offshore drilling occurred as early as 1971, in the Bohai Gulf, but throughout the decade China generally lagged behind its neighbors by a significant technological margin. China objected perfunctorily to foreign exploration in traditional disputed zones, but it was ill equipped either to enforce its protests or compete through offshore programs of its own. Beijing was annoyed by growing encroachments in its claimed areas, but its ire was somewhat tempered by a thriving domestic petroleum industry on land. Output from its onshore sites was so prodigious that in 1974 China surpassed Indonesia as East Asia's top petroleum producer.

China's exclusive emphasis on onshore exploration turned out to be an ephemeral luxury. Southeast Asia's successes in offshore development through the late 1970s and a decline in China's domestic oil production in 1980 figured prominently in Beijing's decision to expand its search for hydrocarbons off shore. China sought foreign assistance in developing fields and in February 1982 established the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to coordinate contracts with foreign oil companies on behalf of the State Council. Seven months later, the first of many cooperative ventures was signed. These joint ventures concentrated their activities in the Gulf of Tonkin and off the mainland coast (particularly in the Pearl River Basin, adjacent to Hong Kong). China's leaders were buoyed by reports that almost a fifth of all estimated Chinese oil potential lay on its continental shelf.

If dwindling onshore petroleum production in the early 1980s was a major consideration in China's new emphasis on offshore production, exploiting resources on the continental shelf was attractive for other reasons as well. Not only were the offshore fields closer to consumers (industrial and population centers along the south and east coast of China), but they were less vulnerable than the onshore fields in northeast and northwest China to potential Soviet attack. The "sweeter" quality of the crude lifted from the South China Sea seabed (the oil was less waxy and sulfuric) also reduced the processing burden on China's heavily taxed oil refineries.

In the years preceding China's first attempt, in early 1988, to occupy reefs in the Spratlys, China's rocketing economy and its need for refined petroleum products threatened to outstrip domestic production capacity. Since 1984 a growing discrepancy had emerged between China's energy supply and demand, and had grown since. The situation was exacerbated by a decline in foreign investment in offshore oil exploration in 1986. In early January 1988, economists calculated that "there is no way a three percent per year growth in oil production can feed sustained growth in refined products demand of six to eight percent per year or growth in demand for light and middle distillates of eight to twelve percent per year." Oil experts estimated China could sustain its 1986 oil production level through at least 2020 but that the expanding consumption requirements of the Chinese economy would oblige it to begin importing oil within the decade. A shortage of energy became one of the most important factors retarding economic growth, and the Chinese increasingly turned their eyes to offshore areas, including the South China Sea.

China's leaders were also eager to find additional sources of petroleum so that they could convert inefficient, coal-burning industries into modern, high-tech factories. The nation's dependence on coal was so profound (China still relies on coal for nearly 80 percent of its energy) that it was a brake on China's rapidly developing economy. Beijing's leaders considered petroleum a sine qua non of Beijing's modernization plans; at the same time, the Chinese Communist Party was preaching a doctrine of "self-reliance." Correspondingly, without additional domestic sources, China's efforts to streamline its industrial base would be slowed, and it would find itself in the ideologically untenable position of relying on foreign suppliers for its lifeblood. Beijing perceived that a successful modernization effort would turn on its ability to manage energy requirements; by the mid-1980s it was already feeling tremendous resource pressure.

China's developing energy crisis lured Beijing to the sea, but other ocean resources were gradually becoming important to China's national health as well. Fishing, for example, was emerging as a source of nutrition that could partly compensate for relative declines in agricultural output. The limiting factor in China's agricultural productivity was, and is, the availability of cultivable land--approximately 10 percent of China's land mass. About half of this cultivable land is of low quality due to such conditions as soil salinity or alkalinity, falling water tables, erosion, and desertification. Significant losses of arable land occurred between 1970 and 1987 as farmland was converted to industrial, transportation, and urban construction purposes. Increasing the efficiency of agricultural production through greater mechanization was complicated by lack of funds for investment and the problem of displaced rural labor.

China not only faced declining amounts of cultivable land, but its population was growing steadily. In the 1980s it was predicted that by the year 2020 China would have 250 million more mouths to feed. Even with population control measures and enhanced agricultural techniques, China's leaders realized, the nation would become increasingly dependent on alternative sources of food. As early as 1984, a high government official asserted that the diet of China's large and growing population would increasingly require the protein supplied by fish. Chinese journals in 1989 similarly argued that 80 percent of the earth's living resources were in the sea and that fish would become an increasingly important source of animal protein. A strong fishing industry had an obvious nutritional benefit, was compatible with China's need for low-technology, human-intensive occupations, and was preferable to importation.

In order to make sure that the descendants of the Chinese nation can survive, develop, prosper and flourish in the world in the future, we should vigorously develop and use the oceans. To protect and defend the rights and interests of the reefs and islands within Chinese waters is a sacred mission. . . . The [Spratly] Islands not only occupy an important strategic position, but every reef and island is connected to a large area of territorial water and an exclusive economic zone that is priceless.

With a view toward emerging resource shortfalls, particularly in the field of energy, China's response to Vietnam's April 1987 occupation of one of the largest reefs in the Spratlys, Barque Canada, was vitriolic. China demanded Vietnam's immediate withdrawal from Barque Canada and nine other islands in the archipelago. Citing Soviet-Vietnamese economic cooperation as evidence that continental shelf oil exploitation was a key project, the Chinese asserted that "Vietnam's purpose in illegally dispatching troops to [Barque Canada] is to occupy the continental shelf nearby and pave the way for its future exploitation of oil." China had been aware the Spratlys had very good oil prospects as early as 1982, when the then president of China's geological society made favorable predictions about oil exploitation there. To reaffirm these calculations, in spring 1987 the People's Republic of China (the PRC) conducted extensive oceanographic research in the vicinity of the Spratly Islands. By the fall of 1987 the Chinese government had concluded that the continental shelf north of James Shoal, in the southernmost part of the archipelago, had a large sedimentary basin that probably contained substantial natural gas and oil deposits. In November 1987, around the time of these findings, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) began to survey outposts for construction in the Spratlys. Soon after, the decision was made to establish a Chinese "sea-level weather research station" on Fiery Cross Reef.

Sensitive to its power projection weaknesses and fearing negative political reactions stemming from a military presence in the maritime heart of Southeast Asia, China disguised the naval missions sent to the Spratlys in late 1987 and early 1988 as scientific expeditions. They involved oceanographic research vessels and warship escorts, which subsequently deposited "scientists" and building materials on a number of reefs. Portraying its actions as "non-aggressive," China claimed that the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization had approved the construction of weather research stations on the cays in question. This defensible justification provided a convenient pretext for an increased naval presence and helped forestall a direct confrontation with Vietnamese forces during the early stages of occupation.

Alarmed by PLAN operations in their "backyard," Vietnam sent aircraft to monitor Chinese construction efforts, and Vietnamese warships shadowed Chinese vessels engaged in survey and patrol. Friction between these opposing forces correspondingly mounted. The volatile mix of Chinese and Vietnamese ships in the same waters predictably led to a series of near-clashes. These brushes usually involved Vietnamese units approaching the reefs on which Chinese investigation teams were working; on at least three occasions, Chinese warships intercepted and turned away the Vietnamese vessels. The situation climaxed in mid-March 1988, when the PLAN sank a Vietnamese auxiliary and damaged an LST operating in the vicinity of Johnson Reef. The PLAN subsequently consolidated its position in the region, planting flags and occupying six reefs (all previously uninhabited) by April 1988.

While it remains unclear what criteria China had used to select the reefs on which it settled, one may have been an aim to undermine rival claims to prospective resources nearby. The occupied reefs are dispersed throughout a number of smaller archipelagos--Laoita Bank, Tizard Bank, Union Reefs (just south of Tizard), and London Reef. By landing on reefs near islands and on reefs held by other claimants, China may have intended to supersede, or at least neutralize, any legal rights of other nations to the surrounding seabed and water column. The only reef distant--and this for defensive purposes--from claims of other states is Fiery Cross, the PLAN "headquarters" in the Spratlys.

Beijing did not have the technological know-how in late 1987 and early 1988 to exploit petroleum so far from its shores. China's leaders, however, acted as if they meant to thwart physical incursions they could not halt using the time-worn technique of diplomatic protest. To Beijing, competition for offshore resources in the South China Sea was becoming a zero-sum game. Aware of the limitations of its existing resource base, China sought to deter foreign encroachments and reserve the area for its own future exploitation.

The next significant development in the ongoing ownership quarrel over the South China Sea was the adoption in February 1992 by the Chinese National People's Congress of the Law of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. Contrary to China's promises to resolve outstanding territorial disputes through friendly discussion, the law was a hard-line assertion of Chinese maritime rights. Its articles claimed exclusive sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys, asserted a right to evict other nations' naval vessels from its territorial waters (presumably even those still under dispute), and authorized the PLA Navy to pursue foreign ships violating its regulations to the high seas. The law also required all foreign warships to give notification of intent to pass through China's territorial seas and to receive permission before doing so. These regulations not only threatened freedom of navigation but revived regional antagonisms over maritime sovereignty.

China quickly acted on its claims. Less than a month after the territorial sea law's proclamation, Chinese forces landed on Da Ba Dau reef, near the Vietnamese-held island of Sin Cowe East. A clash (of which the intensity is not known) took place between Chinese and Vietnamese forces on 19 March 1992. Four months later, Chinese marines landed on Da Lac reef on Tizard Bank. No direct economic benefits accrued from occupying these features. However, Da Ba Dau reef, as of then the easternmost point occupied by the PLA in the Spratlys, is so close to Sin Cowe East Island that its occupation would seem an attempt to trump Vietnam's claims to resources in the eastern part of the archipelago. As in 1988, the PLA avoided direct assaults on occupied islands, landing only on uninhabited reefs. Why was China suddenly taking a more aggressive stance? The most plausible explanation returns to China's pressing economic conditions. Beijing probably interpreted joint development schemes sponsored by other claimants to exploit offshore petroleum in the South China Sea as threats to China's long-term economic sustainability.

Indeed, by 1992 almost all Southeast Asian nations were heavily involved in oil exploration off their coasts. A joint venture sponsored by the Philippines had recently discovered oil off northwest Palawan Island. Malaysia was producing oil from ninety wells in 1992, about half the region's total offshore output. Vietnam was emerging as a major regional oil producer, with its offshore production surpassing China's by mid-1992. Most compelling, a month before China passed its sea-claims law Vietnam and Malaysia had announced their mutual interest in joint development of oil reserves where their claims overlapped. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) viewed the territorial sea law and its manifestations as ominous.

The near-simultaneous declaration of the Law of the Territorial Sea, the Chinese occupation of reefs, and the skirmish with Vietnamese naval units all reflected China's heightened sensitivity to resource invasions in the South China Sea. They were a shrill warning to its neighbors that they could not exclude China from development of the area's natural resources. China's efforts in this direction were undoubtedly encouraged by a renewed promise of huge finds. Revised geological surveys by the Chinese Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources led to speculation that the Spratlys archipelago could contain as much as 105 billion barrels of oil, an amount greater than China's on-shore reserves. The area surrounding James Shoal alone was also estimated to contain upwards of 90 billion barrels of oil.

The latest encroachments, coupled with China's shifting status from oil exporter to net importer, likely had convinced Beijing it needed to become more energetic in asserting its rights over a potentially world-class petroleum field. For influential elements in the Chinese leadership the South China Sea was probably a prize worth the minor costs of diplomatic turbulence with ASEAN. At stake was China's modernization program, which depended upon the finite fuel resources then at its disposal. China's goals were transparent to its neighbors. President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan commented in 1993, "The Chinese Communists want access to the South China Sea since the amount of petroleum there could exceed that under the North Sea."

China's new emphasis on controlling petroleum exploration in distant waters further manifested itself in an unprecedented cooperation contract between CNOOC and an American firm, the Crestone Energy Corporation, in May 1992. The contract called for joint exploration in a twenty-five-thousand-square-kilometer block in the southwest perimeter of the Spratlys archipelago, just inside China's sweeping claim line. The contract was significant not only for its sheer ambitiousness--the water was so deep in most of the contract block that exploration would present major technological challenges--but because the concession was located within two hundred nautical miles of the Vietnamese coast. China appeared to be using Crestone to reaffirm and internationalize its title, justifying its actions by pointing to Vietnamese exploration activity directly west. Hanoi insisted the Crestone concession was illegal, because it fell on Vietnam's continental shelf, but it avoided chastising the U.S. oil company in order not to jeopardize the lifting of the U.S. trade embargo. Endeavoring to reap a share of the rewards of the offshore oil production of its competitors, China was willing to run the risk of sponsoring exploration within Vietnam's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). China even promised PLA Navy protection for Crestone personnel and equipment.

A more assertive policy to satisfy energy concerns helps explain Beijing's actions in the southwest Spratlys where oil prospects were good. But in 1995, Beijing decided to occupy Mischief Reef, in the Philippines claim zone, where the oil potential was relatively meager. Beijing seemed to be throwing political capital to the wind by penetrating deeply into the Philippine EEZ. Why? The best explanation involves China's perceptions of economic threats and its desire to preempt foreign exploration that would leave it a net loser in terms of territory and resources. China's occupation of Mischief Reef was not a bolt from the blue; it was preceded by a chain of events that began with a falling-out with the Philippines over hydrocarbon exploration in the northeast region of the Spratlys.

Joint development talks between China and the Philippines over gas-rich Reed Bank broke down in early 1994; in May, Manila decided to grant a six-month oil exploration permit to Alcorn Petroleum and Minerals Corporation (AGRC). The Philippines was interested in collecting seismic data on the seabed southwest of Reed Bank. Manila hoped the contract would remain a secret, but news of the collaboration soon leaked. Beijing swiftly issued a statement reasserting its sovereignty over the area covered by the license and ignored Manila's belated invitation to become a partner in the project. Manila back-pedaled on the diplomatic front for weeks, but the damage had been done. By secretly licensing an exploration effort the Philippines had appeared to engage in unilateral efforts to exploit the natural resources of the Spratlys.

Stung by Manila's "betrayal," China decided to advance eastward for better surveillance coverage of any Philippine-sponsored oil exploration. Mischief Reef is in the lower-middle section of the Alcorn concession; a presence there would also strengthen China's hand were petroleum ever to be discovered in the area. The Chinese post on Mischief Reef was discovered by Filipino fishermen in February 1995, the advanced state of its buildings indicating that construction had begun in the fall of 1994, just a few months after Manila's "faux pas." China had quietly advanced onto the reef because it believed physical occupation was the only method by which Chinese interests could be protected. Beijing's own misstep was in not foreseeing that this characteristically "defensive" response would be interpreted as offensive.

Economic determinants clearly account for the timing of China's advances in the South China Sea. Oversimplifying the sources of China's behavior, however, can be dangerous and misleading. A more comprehensive view of China's motives to use force in the South China Sea can be reached by examining matters through a broader domestic lens. The demands of national industrialization aside, factors within Chinese government and society that contribute to China's territorial resolve include nationalism, the bureaucratic interests of the Navy (the PLAN), the relative influence of the PLA in domestic politics, and provincial development objectives.

The wellspring of modern Chinese nationalism is the humiliation the nation suffered at the hands of foreigners intent on exploiting and dismembering China for economic and political profit. The nineteenth century saw Western powers seize concession areas in Hong Kong, Guangzhou, Qingdao, and Dalian; Russia bit off sections of Manchuria; Japan captured Taiwan, Korea, and the Ryukyus; and France colonized Indochina. Outer Mongolia took advantage of a deteriorating dynasty to achieve nominal independence in 1912. In 1932, Manchuria became a puppet of Japan. Although some territories were recovered after World War II, by the time the Communists took over in 1949 the erstwhile Qing empire had been sliced into five separate entities: the PRC, the Republic of China on Taiwan, the Mongolian People's Republic, Macau, and Hong Kong.

The Chinese accordingly possess a particular sensitivity about their territorial integrity; it finds expression in contemporary nationalist statements about reunifying the motherland. The Chinese press considers "inseparable" or "inalienable sovereignty” the strongest phrases it can invoke to signal seriousness; the Paracel and Spratly islands are consistently referred to in these terms. Since the late 1970s China's leaders have promoted Chinese nationalism as a unifying force to replace the "carcass of communism." In the decade after Mao's death, the Party realized that revolutionary fervor was becoming unreliable as a source of social cohesion. Emphasizing instead a theme that touches the roots of Chinese pride, the center began to elevate the citizenry's collective "consciousness of suffering" (with regard to sovereignty) as a way of uniting elements of Chinese society that were increasingly disenchanted with the Party's socialist ideology.

By attaching the regime's legitimacy to its ability to protect and defend Chinese sovereignty, however, Party leaders committed themselves to holding firm on the prickly questions of autonomy in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, Xinjiang, and the Spratly Islands. Any Chinese leader who suggests greater autonomy, much less independence, for these areas risks being pilloried for sundering the "sacred motherland." Having wrapped themselves in the flag, the regime's leaders can brook no compromise on the issue of territorial integrity, even if it would be in the short-term national interest to do so.

Assertive nationalists, however, are not the only elements in Chinese society that encourage a hard-line stance. The PLA Navy has seized on instability and tension in the South China Sea to advance its own cause. In its aggressive effort to acquire larger budgets and more modern capabilities, the PLAN has consistently spotlighted as threats the issues emerging from the South China Sea. In the middle to late 1970s the PLAN crafted and obtained political endorsement of an offshore defense policy by linking naval expansion with the maritime threats posed by the ever-present U.S. Seventh Fleet and Soviet Pacific Fleet. Sino-American rapprochement in the late 1970s and Sino-Soviet warming in the mid-1980s, however, dealt major blows to the PLAN's offshore strategy by depriving it of overt threats with which to justify a large, oceangoing maritime force.

Recovery of so-called "lost territories," which hitherto had been a secondary priority of the PLAN, now surfaced as a major, budget-driving mission. Other primary missions of the PLAN, which include strategic deterrence (by submarine-launched ballistic missiles) and the liberation of Taiwan, did not warrant the expensive and wide-ranging capabilities that sea control would. Defending maritime economic interests, particularly offshore territorial claims, soon became the most concrete justification for the PLAN's prospective blue-water navy. Operations at long range from the mainland, such as in the remote Spratlys archipelago, an area fraught with navigational hazards and in proximity to multiple threats, required a "modern, technically proficient, combat-ready, long distance navy skilled in joint operations."

Success in acquiring the requisite share of the budgetary pie hinged on the Navy's ability to fuse its narrow organizational interests with broad economic goals and core national issues. Toward that end, in 1984 the PLAN's commander listed as one of the Navy's main goals the capability to defend Beijing's claim to sovereignty over the South China Sea's rich maritime resources, including offshore petroleum deposits, manganese nodules, and fish. In 1992, during budgetary debates in the National People's Congress, the deputy Navy commander echoed these resource-based arguments, especially China's long-term necessity to make better use of maritime riches, particularly petroleum. Observing that China's offshore oil production output was only 62 percent of Vietnam's, he warned that China could not continue to lag behind other nations in exploiting marine resources without a negative impact on China's economic growth levels in the next century. The PLAN believes the seas have become the "new high ground of strategic competition."

The notion that China's future economic growth depends on its ability to exploit living and nonliving marine resources, and that the PLAN must be equipped to secure these zones, has taken root in the most powerful factions of the Party and central government. The Navy's success in convincing the regime of the fleet's importance in this endeavor is reflected in the Chinese media:

The conflict over China's surrounding waters has been heating up over the years as islands in China's coastal areas and territorial waters [have been] occupied, its maritime space divvied up, and its resources plundered. . . . The only way to give our maritime defense a solid basis is to intensify [our] naval buildup and upgrade our naval buildup defense capability.

Absent an overt Russian or Japanese threat, the PLAN can be expected to continue to view the South China Sea as an area from which new threats to China's sovereignty are likely to emerge. In short, naval leaders hope that protecting Chinese territorial interests from foreign encroachments (i.e., defending the water column and seabed minerals that may be invaluable to China's energy and food supplies in the future) will have wide patriotic and political appeal. The PLAN's influence over budgetary and strategic policy at the seat of government is partly attributable to its success in intertwining its parochial interests with China's national objectives, but it is also facilitated by the influence of its parent organization, the People's Liberation Army itself, in political circles.

The nature of factionalized party-army rule in China has made the PLA the arbiter of power among contending groups atop the Chinese communist system. Indeed, a party leader's power today ultimately relies to a great degree on the breadth and robustness of his personal links with the military. However, the PLA is not a monolithic institution; cleavages exist within it, caused by the attempts of individuals to promote their careers and seek professional security. The PLA's potency is also somewhat weakened by senior military leaders' dependence on Party patronage for political leverage; nonetheless, the PLA exerts a high degree of political authority in Beijing.

The People's Liberation Army is only one of several major organizations that vie for political attention in Beijing, but by virtue of its control over instruments of lethality, it wields substantially more influence than its rivals. The PLA's relative prominence among competing bureaucracies in Beijing was brought home when in 1992 conservative military and senior Party officials pushed through the territorial sea law over the Ministry of Foreign Affair's objections. As telling, for the past five years the senior uniformed military officer on the Politburo was the former PLAN commander, Liu Huaqing, champion of the Navy's strategy in the South China Sea.

Lastly, loosely allied with the nationalists and Navy commanders are officials in the island province of Hainan. Since it became an independent province in 1988, the island has seen rapid economic growth. To maintain this momentum, Hainan is giving top priority to construction of large industrial projects, including a refinery and a gas-fired chemical fertilizer plant, cornerstone industries that will process mineral resources mined on shore or lifted from the floor of the South China Sea. Indeed, the development and processing of mineral resources is being pursued as a key industry of the province over the next five years. Close to thirty mineral resource development projects are to be carried out, the collective output value of which is predicted to be eight times existing production.

The interest of Hainan in Chinese control over the mineral supplies of the South China Sea became clear when its governor made an inspection tour of the Spratlys in January 1992, one month prior to the formal declaration of the 1992 territorial sea law. The governor believed that every 1 percent of the exploited proven resources in the South China Sea would yield a profit equivalent to sixty times Hainan's total economic output in 1990. It is imperative, he stated, for Hainan to "develop the rich resources on the Spratly Islands and in the surrounding waters, to change them into huge material wealth." In the final analysis, ownership over and exploitation of the South China Sea's economic abundance has wide appeal across the spectrum of China's officialdom, from national-level strategists seeking a panacea for China's growing energy demands to provincial administrators eager to expand their areas' industrial capacity.

Some analysts have concluded that if China is serious about tapping the abundant resources of the South China Sea, its best option is to settle the overall dispute and split the profits that would most profusely flow from joint development in a peaceful environment. This path, however, is obstructed by several major factors, not the least of which is China's cultural, political, and economic paradigm of self-reliance. Deeply embedded in the Chinese psyche is an all-pervasive sense of a patron-client hierarchy and a conviction that dependence implies subordination. The era of exploitation by the West that transformed China into a veritable vassal state in the last century was intensely humiliating. These memories still wound the Chinese national self-esteem and sense of identity, nourishing Chinese nationalism in a modern form that is both powerful and assertive. Sensitivity to past injustices has also influenced China's foreign policy and its economic decisions, where autonomy and self-sufficiency are ideals.

Of course, in the interests of providing for the welfare of its citizens China has been forced to make pragmatic choices that compromise its goal of self-reliance. China needs access to Western technology and expertise to modernize, and it has opened trade doors accordingly. Indeed, Jiang Zemin has placed himself at the forefront of such sweeping change. Beijing has set limits on these endeavors, however. Beijing has taken steps to protect its "pillar industries," one of which is the energy sector; it has been hesitant to approve dozens of major refinery and power-generating projects. Despite proclamations of openness, great divisions still exist within the Chinese bureaucracy over how far and how fast foreigners should be allowed to penetrate economically the "motherland."

In truth, Beijing's stress on, and definition of, self-reliance militates against any joint development scheme sponsored by parties interested in resolving the South China Sea quandary politically. From China's standpoint, "joint development" means China dictating terms to a single partner. Beijing prefers to negotiate with state entities and individual companies on a bilateral basis, where its hand is stronger and leverage greater than when dealing with several at once. Beijing finds unappealing political solutions calling for an equitable division of resources, not only because they may require relinquishment of what it considers sovereign ground but also because they forfeit some measure of economic independence.

Based on current predictions of China's energy requirements, China's incentive to remain unswerving in its ambitions to control most of the South China Sea is exceedingly great. At present why is this problem so grave? Why are we fighting over this? Mainly because of the oil. . . . [A]t present our one year [oil] production and production quantity has not even reached the 100 million [ton] mark and if there is at least 15 billion tons [in the South China Sea], then we could have 150 years of production. So, we want this. In 1994, China consumed five barrels of oil per capita; conservative estimates indicate that demand will rise to ten barrels within a decade. While China is attempting to make better use of its onshore fields, technology trends (for instance, mobile rigs capable of exploring for and producing oil in ever deeper waters) suggest that the seabed will only become a more valued and accessible prize.

Offshore petroleum production accounts already for a fast-growing (if now small) share of China's overall output. Chinese offshore oil production has been increasing at an average annual rate of 39.6 percent for the past decade. One analyst estimates by the year 2000, nearly 40 percent of China's gross crude oil yield may be brought in from sea. Many Chinese think the Spratly area is likely to become the second Persian Gulf. China may well feel that it must play for keeps or inexorably become dependent on foreign energy suppliers, perhaps again subject to foreigners' manipulations.

It might be imagined that China may also perceive, however, that a powerful argument against further expansion in the South China Sea is that it may lead to global ostracization. This reasoning asserts that China risks casting itself into a kind of international purgatory if it oversteps its bounds too many times. Ironically, in fact, many Chinese think that precisely because China may find itself internationally besieged in the future, it must become ever more self-reliant. In other words, China should fully and unilaterally exploit all the resources available as a fail-safe against the possibility of future estrangement from the world community.

It is impossible to predict exactly the timing and location of Beijing's next move in the Spratlys, but the areas most likely to see conflict are those claimed by China but economically exploited by rivals. In April 1996 Vietnam signed an exploration deal with a U.S.-based company, Conoco, to conduct hydrocarbon surveys in two blocks that overlap the Benton (ex-Crestone) concession in the southwestern section of the Spratlys.

This area is a likely flashpoint, and it deserves greater attention than it currently receives. Large, proven petroleum reserves exist nearby. Vietnam's southern continental shelf is its most lucrative offshore source of oil. Two fields, Big Bear and Blue Dragon, have by themselves practically underwritten Vietnam's economy, and both fields are located less than eight kilometers west of the Benton block, and within or astride China's claim line. In the contested block reside at least two Vietnamese outposts, on Vanguard Bank and Prince Consort Bank, increasing the risks of potential conflict. Also, China appears ready to honor, in this case, a standing promise to protect contractor equipment and personnel with its navy.

Minor clashes have occurred in or near concession blocks off the Vietnamese coast. Vietnam alleges that a Chinese seismic survey ship harassed a British Petroleum-led exploration off Vietnam's southeastern continental shelf in May 1993. Vietnamese gunboats escorted a Chinese research vessel out of the Crestone block in April 1994. In July 1994 Chinese naval units blockaded a drilling rig licensed by Hanoi. Because both countries are becoming increasingly reliant on offshore petroleum to fuel their respective economies, the risks are high that one side or the other will contemplate force to defend its concessions.

The region has been calm, lately, because Benton Oil & Gas has yet to send exploration equipment to the concession, but the volatility of this area may sharply increase when petroleum exploration vessels begin to converge. The only spark that may be needed to ignite conflict in this region is the discovery of commercially viable quantities of oil or natural gas. Given the massive volume of shipping funneled through this particular stretch of the South China Sea, developments there should be monitored closely.

Of course, several other friction points along China's periphery exist--disputed offshore zones claimed by Beijing but exploited to some degree by others. China continues to maintain serious claims, for example, in the Gulf of Tonkin and the Senkakus (northeast of Taiwan). So far, marginal hydrocarbon finds in the former and the larger strategic importance of Sino-Japanese relations restrain Beijing, but one can expect that as the disparity between domestic energy production and consumption grows, China will become increasingly less inclined to compromise away potentially resource-rich territory in these sea zones as well.

While China will almost always act pragmatically when larger strategic issues are at stake, future leaders may behave less moderately where large, proven caches of petroleum are discovered, particularly if a more muscular PLA Navy is standing by to "arbitrate" claims. Indeed, PLAN leaders assert, We cannot resolve problems with political or diplomatic measures until we have [great] naval strength, and only then will it be possible to "overcome our enemies without engaging in battles." If intimidation fails to achieve any effects, we would then be able to actually deal an effective blow.

Of course, the likelihood of prolonged combat over offshore disputes is extremely low. China hopes to outmaneuver rather than fight its competitors. Beijing is very much aware that if disagreements result in open warfare China risks being stigmatized as East Asia's new hegemony, in turn upsetting the stable environment within which it has prospered over the last two decades. Eruption of quick-flare, short-burn fights on the order of the March 1988 skirmish, however, cannot be so easily discounted. Indeed, China is currently gearing its military forces to deal with such special "local war" situations. In the future Beijing may feel compelled to use these instruments should other methods fail to preserve the integrity of its treasured "blue territories."

Economic imperatives have emerged as the crucial factor in the timing and rationale for China's expanded presence in the South China Sea. While the golden thread of sovereignty is interlaced with China's every move in the Spratlys in particular, current trends indicate that China takes action when economic threats break a threshold of tolerance. As innocuous as they appear, offshore joint development schemes sponsored by Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines have been consistently interpreted by Beijing as serious threats to its prosperity. Indeed, the triggers that set PLAN warships into motion are resource-related encroachments by China's neighbors. In an era of resource scarcity, these events more than any other heighten China's sense of territorial and economic vulnerability.

Viewed in this light, China's occupation of reefs in 1988, the 1992 sea law, and the Mischief Reef takeover were driven less by opportunism than a belief that it was necessary to respond to imminent challenges to presumed Chinese dominion over these maritime areas. Domestic forces reinforce China's inflexibility about control of the disputed waters. Nationalist politicians, PLAN leaders, economists, and certain provincial officials represent a loose but powerful coalition exerting influence over decision makers in Beijing.

These domestic elements possess a vested interest in ensuring that China responds in a forthright manner to perceived encroachments in the South China Sea. That negative repercussions stemming from China's arrogation of Mischief Reef has not significantly altered this dynamic was best exemplified by official and semiofficial pronouncements during the 1997 Kan Tan III incident. The Chinese foreign ministry vigorously reaffirmed China's exclusive ownership of the economic zone, while the Beijing-based China Daily quoted senior Chinese economists as saying exploration of natural resources in the disputed South China Sea was essential for China's economic growth.

Petroleum is certainly not the sole motivating force in China's calculations, of course. A powerful argument can be made that Beijing hopes to cast the widest possible net over the sea so other marine treasures--perhaps resources that will prove more vital to China's economy than petroleum is today--can be hauled in by future generations. The islets and reefs in the South China Sea are valued not for themselves but as fixed points upon which to attach much larger claims to surrounding maritime zones.

A solution to this complex problem, which intertwines historical, political, economic, and even cultural threads, will not be arrived at easily. One can only hope China will begin to trust that dependence on foreign energy suppliers is not a major source of strategic vulnerability. Domestic trends in China, however, particularly the growth of jingoistic nationalism, suggest that Beijing will not soon abandon its efforts at maximizing self-sufficiency in its core industries. Until this paradigm shifts from within or is gently dismantled from without, one can expect that China's propensity to take action in the South China Sea will remain strongly influenced by its dependence on offshore resources. One can also expect Beijing to pay close attention to the policies of other littoral states, as well as the United States and Japan, toward evolving South China Sea issues and tensions. If this analysis is correct, moreover, one may have to examine other Chinese foreign policy issues in a new light.

Let's face it -- English is a crazy language. There is no egg in eggplant nor ham in hamburger; neither apple nor pine in pineapple. English muffins weren't invented in England or French fries in France. Sweetmeats are candies while sweetbreads, which aren't sweet, are meat. We take English for granted. But if we explore its paradoxes, we find that quicksand can work slowly, boxing rings are square and a guinea pig is neither from Guinea nor is it a pig.

And why is it that writers write but fingers don't fing, grocers don't groce and hammers don't ham? If the plural of tooth is teeth, why isn't the plural of booth beeth? One goose, 2 geese. So one moose, 2 meese... One blouse, 2 blice? Doesn't it seem crazy that you can make amends but not one amend, that you comb through annals of history but not a single annal? If you have a bunch of odds and ends and get rid of all but one of them, what do you call it?

If teachers taught, why didn't preachers praught? If a vegetarian eats vegetables, what does a humanitarian eat? If you wrote a letter, perhaps you bote your tongue? Sometimes I think all the English speakers should be committed to an asylum for the verbally insane. In what language do people recite at a play and play at a recital? Ship by truck and send cargo by ship? Have noses that run and feet that smell? Park on driveways and drive on parkways?

How can a "slim chance" and a "fat chance" be the same, while a "wise man" and "wise guy" are opposites? How can overlook and oversee be opposites, while "quite a lot" and "quite a few" are alike? How can the weather be "hot as hell" one day and "cold as hell" another? Have you noticed that we talk about certain things only when they are absent? Have you ever seen a horseful carriage or a strapful gown? Met a sung hero or experienced requited love? Have you ever run into someone who was combobulated, gruntled, ruly or peccable? And where are all those people who are spring chickens or who would actually hurt a fly?

You have to marvel at the unique lunacy of a language in which your house can burn up as it burns down, in which you fill in a form by filling it out and in which an alarm clock goes off by going on. English was invented by people, not computers, and it reflects the creativity of the human race (which, of course, isn't a race at all). That is why, when the stars are out, they are visible, but when the lights are out, they are invisible. And why, when I wind up my watch, I start it, but when I wind up this essay, I end it? Now I know why I flunked my English. It's not my fault, the silly language doesn't quite know whether it's coming or going.

Perhaps the most admirable part of the response to the conflict that began on Sept. 11 has been a general reluctance to call it a religious war. Officials and commentators have rightly stressed that this is not a battle between the Muslim world and the West, that the murderers are not representative of Islam. President Bush went to the Islamic Center in Washington to reinforce the point. At prayer meetings across the United States and throughout the world, Muslim leaders have been included alongside Christians, Jews and Buddhists.

The only problem with this otherwise laudable effort is that it doesn't hold up under inspection. The religious dimension of this conflict is central to its meaning. The words of Osama bin Laden are saturated with religious argument and theological language. Whatever else the Taliban regime is in Afghanistan, it is fanatically religious. Although some Muslim leaders have criticized the terrorists, and even Saudi Arabia's rulers have distanced themselves from the militants, other Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere have not denounced these acts, have been conspicuously silent or have indeed celebrated them. The terrorists' strain of Islam is clearly not shared by most Muslims and is deeply unrepresentative of Islam's glorious, civilized and peaceful past. But it surely represents a part of Islam -- a radical, fundamentalist part -- that simply cannot be ignored or denied.

In that sense, this surely is a religious war -- but not ofIslam versus Christianity and Judaism. Rather, it is a war of fundamentalism against faiths of all kinds that are at peace with freedom and modernity. This war even has far gentler echoes in America's own religious conflicts -- between newer, more virulent strands of Christian fundamentalism and mainstream Protestantism and Catholicism. These conflicts have ancient roots, but they seem to be gaining new force as modernity spreads and deepens. They are our new wars of religion -- and their victims are in all likelihood going to mount with each passing year.

Osama bin Laden himself couldn't be clearer about the religious underpinnings of his campaign of terror. In 1998, he told his followers, ''The call to wage war against America was made because America has spearheaded the crusade against the Islamic nation, sending tens of thousands of its troops to the land of the two holy mosques over and above its meddling in its affairs and its politics and its support of the oppressive, corrupt and tyrannical regime that is in control.'' Notice the use of the word ''crusade,'' an explicitly religious term, and one that simply ignores the fact that the last few major American interventions abroad -- in Kuwait, Somalia and the Balkans -- were all conducted in defense of Muslims.

Notice also that as bin Laden understands it, the ''crusade'' America is alleged to be leading is not against Arabs but against the Islamic nation, which spans many ethnicities. This nation knows no nation-states as they actually exist in the region -- which is why this form of Islamic fundamentalism is also so worrying to the rulers of many Middle Eastern states. Notice also that bin Laden's beef is with American troops defiling the land of Saudi Arabia -- the land of the two holy mosques,'' in Mecca and Medina.

In 1998, he also told followers that his terrorism was ''of the commendable kind, for it is directed at the tyrants and the aggressors and the enemies of Allah.'' He has a litany of grievances against Israel as well, but his concerns are not primarily territorial or procedural. ''Our religion is under attack,'' he said baldly. The attackers are Christians and Jews. When asked to sum up his message to the people of the West, bin Laden couldn't have been clearer: ''Our call is the call of Islam that was revealed to Muhammad. It is a call to all mankind. We have been entrusted with good cause to follow in the footsteps of the messenger and to communicate his message to all nations.''

This is a religious war against ''unbelief and unbelievers,'' in bin Laden's words. Are these cynical words designed merely to use Islam for nefarious ends? We cannot know the precise motives of bin Laden, but we can know that he would not use these words if he did not think they had salience among the people he wishes to inspire and provoke. This form of Islam is not restricted to bin Laden alone.

Its roots lie in an extreme and violent strain in Islam that emerged in the 18th century in opposition to what was seen by some Muslims as Ottoman decadence but has gained greater strength in the 20th. For the past two decades, this form of Islamic fundamentalism has racked the Middle East. It has targeted almost every regime in the region and, as it failed to make progress, has extended its hostility into the West. From the assassination of Anwar Sadat to the fatwa against Salman Rushdie to the decade long campaign of bin Laden to the destruction of ancient Buddhist statues and the hideous persecution of women and homosexuals by the Taliban to the World Trade Center massacre, there is a single line. That line is a fundamentalist, religious one. And it is an Islamic one.

Most interpreters of the Koran find no arguments in it for the murder of innocents. But it would be naive to ignore in Islam a deep thread of intolerance toward unbelievers, especially if those unbelievers are believed to be a threat to the Islamic world. There are many passages in the Koran urging mercy toward others, tolerance, respect for life and so on. But there are also passages as violent as this: ''And when the sacred months are passed, kill those who join other gods with God wherever ye shall find them; and seize them, besiege them, and lay wait for them with every kind of ambush.'' And this: ''Believers! Wage war against such of the infidels as are your neighbors, and let them find you rigorous.'' Bernard Lewis, the great scholar of Islam, writes of the dissonance within Islam: ''There is something in the religious culture of Islam which inspired, in even the humblest peasant or peddler, a dignity and a courtesy toward others never exceeded and rarely equaled in other civilizations.

And yet, in moments of upheaval and disruption, when the deeper passions are stirred, this dignity and courtesy toward others can give way to an explosive mixture of rage and hatred which impels even the government of an ancient and civilized country -- even the spokesman of a great spiritual and ethical religion -- to espouse kidnapping and assassination, and try to find, in the life of their prophet, approval and indeed precedent for such actions.'' Since Muhammad was, unlike many other religious leaders, not simply a sage or a prophet but a ruler in his own right, this exploitation of his politics is not as great a stretch as some would argue.

This use of religion for extreme repression, and even terror, is not of course restricted to Islam. For most of its history, Christianity has had a worse record. From the Crusades to the Inquisition to the bloody religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, Europe saw far more blood spilled for religion's sake than the Muslim world did. And given how expressly nonviolent the teachings of the Gospels are, the perversion of Christianity in this respect was arguably greater than bin Laden's selective use of Islam. But it is there nonetheless. It seems almost as if there is something inherent in religious monotheism that lends itself to this kind of terrorist temptation. And our bland attempts to ignore this -- to speak of this violence as if it did not have religious roots -- is some kind of denial. We don't want to denigrate religion as such, and so we deny that religion is at the heart of this. But we would understand this conflict better, perhaps, if we first acknowledged that religion is responsible in some way, and then figured out how and why.

The first mistake is surely to condescend to fundamentalism. We may disagree with it, but it has attracted millions of adherents for centuries, and for a good reason. It elevates and comforts. It provides a sense of meaning and direction to those lost in a disorienting world. The blind recourse to texts embraced as literal truth, the injunction to follow the commandments of God before anything else, the subjugation of reason and judgment and even conscience to the dictates of dogma: these can be exhilarating and transformative.

They have led human beings to perform extraordinary acts of both good and evil. And they have an internal logic to them. If you believe that there is an eternal afterlife and that endless indescribable torture awaits those who disobey God's law, then it requires no huge stretch of imagination to make sure that you not only conform to each diktat but that you also encourage and, if necessary, coerce others to do the same. The logic behind this is impeccable. Sin begets sin. The sin of others can corrupt you as well. The only solution is to construct a world in which such sin is outlawed and punished and constantly purged -- by force if necessary. It is not crazy to act this way if you believe these things strongly enough. In some ways, it's crazier to believe these things and not act this way.

In a world of absolute truth, in matters graver than life and death, there is no room for dissent and no room for theological doubt. Hence the reliance on literal interpretations of texts -- because interpretation can lead to error, and error can lead to damnation. Hence also the ancient Catholic insistence on absolute church authority. Without infallibility, there can be no guarantee of truth. Without such a guarantee, confusion can lead to hell.

Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor makes the case perhaps as well as anyone. In the story told by Ivan Karamazov in ''The Brothers Karamazov,'' Jesus returns to earth during the Spanish Inquisition. On a day when hundreds have been burned at the stake for heresy, Jesus performs miracles. Alarmed, the Inquisitor arrests Jesus and imprisons him with the intent of burning him at the stake as well. What follows is a conversation between the Inquisitor and Jesus. Except it isn't a conversation because Jesus says nothing. It is really a dialogue between two modes of religion, an exploration of the tension between the extraordinary, transcendent claims of religion and human beings' inability to live up to them, or even fully believe them.

According to the Inquisitor, Jesus' crime was revealing that salvation was possible but still allowing humans the freedom to refuse it. And this, to the Inquisitor, was a form of cruelty. When the truth involves the most important things imaginable -- the meaning of life, the fate of one's eternal soul, the difference between good and evil -- it is not enough to premise it on the capacity of human choice. That is too great a burden. Choice leads to unbelief or distraction or negligence or despair. What human beings really need is the certainty of truth, and they need to see it reflected in everything around them -- in the cultures in which they live, enveloping them in a seamless fabric of faith that helps them resist the terror of choice and the abyss of unbelief. This need is what the Inquisitor calls the ''fundamental secret of human nature.'' He explains:''These pitiful creatures are concerned not only to find what one or the other can worship, but to find something that all would believe in and worship; what is essential is that all may be together in it. This craving for community of worship is the chief misery of every man individually and of all humanity since the beginning of time.''

This is the voice of fundamentalism. Faith cannot exist alone in a single person. Indeed, faith needs others for it to survive -- and the more complete the culture of faith, the wider it is, and the more total its infiltration of the world, the better. It is hard for us to wrap our minds around this today, but it is quite clear from the accounts of the Inquisition and, indeed, of the religious wars that continued to rage in Europe for nearly three centuries, that many of the fanatics who burned human beings at the stake were acting out of what they genuinely thought were the best interests of the victims. With the power of the state, they used fire, as opposed to simple execution, because it was thought to be spiritually cleansing. A few minutes of hideous torture on earth were deemed a small price to pay for helping such souls avoid eternal torture in the afterlife. Moreover, the example of such government-sponsored executions helped create a culture in which certain truths were reinforced and in which it was easier for more weak people to find faith. The burden of this duty to uphold the faith lay on the men required to torture, persecute and murder the unfaithful. And many of them believed, as no doubt some Islamic fundamentalists believe, that they were acting out of mercy and godliness.

This is the authentic voice of the Taliban. It also finds itself replicated in secular form. What, after all, were the totalitarian societies of Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia if not an exact replica of this kind of fusion of politics and ultimate meaning? Under Lenin's and Stalin's rules, the imminence of salvation through revolutionary consciousness was in perpetual danger of being undermined by those too weak to have faith -- the bourgeois or the kulaks or the intellectuals. So they had to be liquidated or purged. Similarly, it is easy for us to dismiss the Nazis as evil, as they surely were. It is harder for us to understand that in some twisted fashion, they truly believed that they were creating a new dawn for humanity, a place where all the doubts that freedom brings could be dispelled in a rapture of racial purity and destiny. Hence the destruction of all dissidents and the Jews -- carried out by fire as the Inquisitors had before, an act of purification different merely in its scale, efficiency and Godlessness.

Perhaps the most important thing for us to realize today is that the defeat of each of these fundamentalisms required a long and arduous effort. The conflict with Islamic fundamentalism is likely to take as long. For unlike Europe's religious wars, which taught Christians the futility of fighting to the death over something beyond human understanding and so immune to any definitive resolution, there has been no such educative conflict in the Muslim world. Only Iran and Afghanistan have experienced the full horror of revolutionary fundamentalism, and only Iran has so far seen reason to moderate to some extent. From everything we see, the lessons Europe learned in its bloody history have yet to be absorbed within the Muslim world. There, as in 16th-century Europe, the promise of purity and salvation seems far more enticing than the mundane allure of mere peace. That means that we are not at the end of this conflict but in its very early stages.

America is not a neophyte in this struggle. the United States has seen several waves of religious fervor since its founding. But American evangelicalism has always kept its distance from governmental power. The Christian separation between what is God's and what is Caesar's -- drawn from the Gospels -- helped restrain the fundamentalist temptation. The last few decades have proved an exception, however. As modernity advanced, and the certitudes of fundamentalist faith seemed mocked by an increasingly liberal society, evangelicals mobilized and entered politics. Their faith sharpened, their zeal intensified, the temptation to fuse political and religious authority beckoned more insistently.

Mercifully, violence has not been a significant feature of this trend -- but it has not been absent. The murders of abortion providers show what such zeal can lead to. And indeed, if people truly believe that abortion is the same as mass murder, then you can see the awful logic of the terrorism it has spawned. This is the same logic as bin Laden's. If faith is that strong, and it dictates a choice between action or eternal damnation, then violence can easily be justified. In retrospect, we should be amazed not that violence has occurred -- but that it hasn't occurred more often.

The critical link between Western and Middle Eastern fundamentalism is surely the pace of social change. If you take your beliefs from books written more than a thousand years ago, and you believe in these texts literally, then the appearance of the modern world must truly terrify. If you believe that women should be consigned to polygamous, concealed servitude, then Manhattan must appear like Gomorrah. If you believe that homosexuality is a crime punishable by death, as both fundamentalist Islam and the Bible dictate, then a world of same-sex marriage is surely Sodom.

It is not a big step to argue that such centers of evil should be destroyed or undermined, as bin Laden does, or to believe that their destruction is somehow a consequence of their sin, as Jerry Falwell argued. Look again at Falwell's now infamous words in the wake of Sept. 11: ''I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle, the A.C.L.U., People for the American Way -- all of them who have tried to secularize America -- I point the finger in their face and say, 'You helped this happen.'''

And why wouldn't he believe that? He has subsequently apologized for the insensitivity of the remark but not for its theological underpinning. He cannot repudiate the theology -- because it is the essence of what he believes in and must believe in for his faith to remain alive. The other critical aspect of this kind of faith is insecurity. American fundamentalists know they are losing the culture war. They are terrified of failure and of the Godless world they believe is about to engulf or crush them. They speak and think defensively. They talk about renewal, but in their private discourse they expect damnation for an America that has lost sight of the fundamentalist notion of God.

Similarly, Muslims know that the era of Islam's imperial triumph has long since gone. For many centuries, the civilization of Islam was the center of the world. It eclipsed Europe in the Dark Ages, fostered great learning and expanded territorially well into Europe and Asia. But it has all been downhill from there. From the collapse of the Ottoman Empire onward, it has been on the losing side of history. The response to this has been an intermittent flirtation with Westernization but far more emphatically a reaffirmation of the most irredentist and extreme forms of the culture under threat. Hence the odd phenomenon of Islamic extremism beginning in earnest only in the last 200 years.

With Islam, this has worse implications than for other cultures that have had rises and falls. For Islam's religious tolerance has always been premised on its own power. It was tolerant when it controlled the territory and called the shots. When it lost territory and saw itself eclipsed by the West in power and civilization, tolerance evaporated. To cite Lewis again on Islam: ''What is truly evil and unacceptable is the domination of infidels over true believers. For true believers to rule misbelievers is proper and natural, since this provides for the maintenance of the holy law and gives the misbelievers both the opportunity and the incentive to embrace the true faith. But for misbelievers to rule over true believers is blasphemous and unnatural, since it leads to the corruption of religion and morality in society and to the flouting or even the abrogation of God's law.''

Thus the horror at the establishment of the State of Israel, an infidel country in Muslim lands, a bitter reminder of the eclipse of Islam in the modern world. Thus also the revulsion at American bases in Saudi Arabia. While colonialism of different degrees is merely political oppression for some cultures, for Islam it was far worse. It was blasphemy that had to be avenged and countered.

I cannot help thinking of this defensiveness when I read stories of the suicide bombers sitting poolside in Florida or racking up a $48 vodka tab in an American restaurant. We tend to think that this assimilation into the West might bring Islamic fundamentalists around somewhat, temper their zeal. But in fact, the opposite is the case. The temptation of American and Western culture -- indeed, the very allure of such culture -- may well require a repression all the more brutal if it is to be overcome.

The transmission of American culture into the heart of what bin Laden calls the Islamic nation requires only two responses -- capitulation to unbelief or a radical strike against it. There is little room in the fundamentalist psyche for a moderate accommodation. The very psychological dynamics that lead repressed homosexuals to be viciously homophobic or that entice sexually tempted preachers to inveigh against immorality are the very dynamics that lead vodka-drinking fundamentalists to steer planes into buildings. It is not designed to achieve anything, construct anything, argue anything. It is a violent acting out of internal conflict.

And America is the perfect arena for such acting out. For the question of religious fundamentalism was not only familiar to the founding fathers. In many ways, it was the central question that led to America's existence. The first American immigrants, after all, were refugees from the religious wars that engulfed England and that intensified under England's Taliban, Oliver Cromwell. One central influence on the founders' political thought was John Locke, the English liberal who wrote the now famous ''Letter on Toleration.'' In it, Locke argued that true salvation could not be a result of coercion, that faith had to be freely chosen to be genuine and that any other interpretation was counter to the Gospels. Following Locke, the founders established as a central element of the new American order a stark separation of church and state, ensuring that no single religion could use political means to enforce its own orthodoxies.

We cite this as a platitude today without absorbing or even realizing its radical nature in human history -- and the deep human predicament it was designed to solve. It was an attempt to answer the eternal human question of how to pursue the goal of religious salvation for ourselves and others and yet also maintain civil peace. What the founders and Locke were saying was that the ultimate claims of religion should simply not be allowed to interfere with political and religious freedom. They did this to preserve peace above all -- but also to preserve true religion itself.

The security against an American Taliban is therefore relatively simple: it's the Constitution. And the surprising consequence of this separation is not that it led to a collapse of religious faith in America -- as weak human beings found themselves unable to believe without social and political reinforcement -- but that it led to one of the most vibrantly religious civil societies on earth. No other country has achieved this. And it is this achievement that the Taliban and bin Laden have now decided to challenge. It is a living, tangible rebuke to everything they believe in.

That is why this coming conflict is indeed as momentous and as grave as the last major conflicts, against Nazism and Communism, and why it is not hyperbole to see it in these epic terms. What is at stake is yet another battle against a religion that is succumbing to the temptation Jesus refused in the desert -- to rule by force. The difference is that this conflict is against a more formidable enemy than Nazism or Communism. The secular totalitarianisms of the 20th century were, in President Bush's memorable words, ''discarded lies.'' They were fundamentalisms built on the very weak intellectual conceits of a master race and a Communist revolution.

But Islamic fundamentalism is based on a glorious civilization and a great faith. It can harness and co-opt and corrupt true and good believers if it has a propitious and toxic enough environment. It has a more powerful logic than either Stalin's or Hitler's Godless ideology, and it can serve as a focal point for all the other societies in the world, whose resentment of Western success and civilization comes more easily than the arduous task of accommodation to modernity. We have to somehow defeat this without defeating or even opposing a great religion that is nonetheless extremely inexperienced in the toleration of other ascendant and more powerful faiths. It is hard to underestimate the extreme delicacy and difficulty of this task.

In this sense, the symbol of this conflict should not be Old Glory, however stirring it is. What is really at issue here is the simple but immensely difficult principle of the separation of politics and religion. We are fighting not for our country as such or for our flag. We are fighting for the universal principles of our Constitution -- and the possibility of free religious faith it guarantees. We are fighting for religion against one of the deepest strains in religion there is. And not only our lives but our souls are at stake.

Should you find something on your dinner plate that doesn't appeal to you, don't complain. There are people who don't have anything on their plate. Should you find yourself stuck in traffic, don't despair. There are people in this world for whom driving is an unheard of privilege. Should you have a bad day at work, think of the man who has been out of work for years.

Should you despair over a relationship gone bad, think of the person who has never known what it's like to love and be loved in return. Should you grieve the passing of another weekend, think of the woman in dire straits, working twelve hours a day, seven days a week to feed her children. Should your car break down, leaving you miles away from assistance, think of the paraplegic who would love the opportunity to take that walk.

Should you notice a new gray hair in the mirror, think of the cancer patient in chemotherapy who wishes she had hair to examine. Should you find yourself at a loss and pondering what is life all about, asking what is my purpose? Be thankful. There are those who didn't live long enough to get the opportunity. Should you find yourself the victim of other people's bitterness, ignorance, smallness or insecurities, remember, things could be worse. You could be them!

You - and only you -- are the one who decides what you think from moment to moment. At any time, you can decide to take the high road toward success and prosperity by choosing to be radiantly alive, experiencing the glory of a full life in all its brilliance, or you can take the low road toward mediocrity in life. The quality of your thoughts determines the quality of your life.

What you think is always your choice and it is up to you to take control of this awesome power. Choose thoughts of joy over despair, happiness over tears and great health over sickness. Choose thoughts of action over indecision, growth over stagnation and companionship over loneliness. Choose thoughts of power over fear, enthusiasm over apathy and love over anger. Choose to feed your mind positive thoughts of the amazing universal abundance that surrounds you.

Directly you will materialize into your life a superabundance of all good things life has to offer; all the love and laughter, all the joy and happiness; all the confidence and spontaneity; and all the health, wealth, wisdom and fulfillment you can possibly desire. These are all available for you now if you will decide, "Yes this is what I truly want for my life". Choose to harness the amazing power of your mind to direct your ultimate destiny. Choice truly is your greatest power.

After a while, they came to a high, white stone wall along one side of the road. It looked like fine marble. At the top of a long hill a tall white arch that gleamed in the sunlight broke it. When he was standing before it, he saw a magnificent gate in the arch that looked like mother of pearl, and the street that led to the gate looked like pure gold. He was pleased that he had finally arrived at heaven, and the man and his dog walked toward the gate.

As he got closer, he saw someone sitting at a beautifully carved desk off to one side. When he was close enough, he called out, "Excuse me, but is this heaven?" "Yes, it is, sir," the man answered. "Wow! Would you happen to have some water? the man asked. "Of course, sir. Come right in, and I'll have some ice water brought right up."

The gatekeeper gestured to his rear, and the huge gate began to open. "I assume my friend can come in?" the man asked, gesturing toward his dog. But the reply was "I'm sorry, sir, but we don't accept pets." The man thought about it then thanked the gatekeeper turned back toward the road, and continued in the direction he had been going.

After another long walk he reached the top of another long hill, and he came to a dirt road that led through a farm gate. There was no fence, and it looked as if the gate had never been closed, as grass had grown up around it. As he approached the gate, he saw a man just inside, sitting in the shade of a tree in a rickety old chair, reading a book. "Excuse me!" he called to the reader. "Do you have any water?" "Certainly, There's a pump over there," the man said, pointing to a place that couldn't be seen from outside the gate. "Come on in and make yourself at home." "How about my friend here?" the traveler gestured to the dog "He's welcome too, and there's a bowl by the pump," he said.

They walked through the gate and, sure enough, there was an old-fashioned hand pump with a dipper hanging on it and a bowl next to it on the ground. The man filled the bowl for his dog; he then took a long drink himself. When both were satisfied, he and the dog walked back toward the man, who was sitting under the tree waiting for them, and asked, "What do you call this place?"

"This is heaven," was the answer. "Well, that's confusing," the traveler said. "It certainly doesn't look like heaven, and there's another man down the road who said that place was heaven." "Oh, you mean the place with the gold street and pearly gates?" "Yes, it was beautiful." "Nope. That's hell." "Doesn't it offend you for them to use the name of heaven like that?" "No. I can see how you might think so, but it actually saves us a lot of time. They screen out the people who are willing to leave their best friends behind."